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Abstract 
We analyze the empirical relationship between journal prices, their quality measured by 
their citation counts, their age, as well as conduct of publishers. The database covers 22 
scientific fields and over 2600 among the most highly reputed and cited journals in 
2003. We show that (a) for-profit journals charge roughly 3 times more than journals 
run by scientific societies; (b) the number of citations has a positive impact on prices; 
(c) there are large differences in prices across fields that vary from 1 and 6; these are 
highly (and positively) correlated with the degree of concentration in the industry.  
                                                
* This paper revisits Section 3 of Dewatripont et al. (2006), and extends the results 
showing that publishers’ concentration in a scientific field has an impact on prices. We 
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1. Introduction 
 
The high prices of scientific journals, and the burden they represent for 
university library budgets, are a subject of intense debate in academic and policy 
circles. This paper offers systematic evidence on price levels and on their 
determinants. Though we have now entered the era of electronic journals and of 
bundled pricing, our analysis concentrates on prices of individual printed 
journals. Individual prices are still relevant, since pricing of bundles is very 
often based on the libraries’ pre-existing print subscriptions, and individual 
electronic journals are usually priced as a percentage of their print price.1  
Electronic publishing does represent some specific costs (as well as savings, 
in other dimensions), but it is important to stress that this transition cannot be 
held responsible for the high prices that libraries complain about. While 
expenses linked to electronic publishing have really started in the mid-1990’s,2 
data discussed by Tenopir and King (2000) show that very significant price 
increases have taken place much earlier. Kyrillidou and Young (2004, p. 11) 
indicate that the price for an average journal rose faster between 1986 and 1995 
at a time where technology was stable, than between 1995 and 2003, where 
publishers have faced costs to undertake the electronic transition.  
Many authors have provided evidence indicating that journals held by FP 
publishers are significantly more expensive than journals published by NFP 
organizations. However, these studies are either concentrated on specific fields3 
or aggregate several fields.4 As will be clear later on, there are large differences 
across fields. Therefore the results obtained for one field may not be relevant for 
others and aggregating fields may give a biased view. This led us to study the 
prices charged in 2003 by 2,630 journals in 22 fields of natural and social 
sciences. 
We estimate a simple hedonic model in which we isolate the effect of 
observable measures of quality (citations, number or articles per issue, age of 
the journal) and of conduct (for profit publisher, scientific society publisher, 
scientific society journal managed by a for profit publisher).   
The paper uses the same database as Dewatripont et al. (2006), but the 
analysis has been extended and deals in a more direct way with the influence on 
                                                
1 Elsevier’s senior Vice-President Karen Hunter suggest that even in the electronic age, individual 
journals remain as strong as ever: “I don’t see the end of the individual journal.” She also added 
that Elsevier had seen a return to demand for title-by-title subscription in place of all-you-can-eat 
deals. See Elsevier reviews its journal models, 2006. www.iwr.co.uk/information-world-
review/news/ 2154589/elsevier-reviews-journal-models. Accessed April 28, 2006 
2 As indicated for example by Elsevier. See Reed Elsevier (2005).  
3 Economics in Chressanthis and Chressanthis (1994) and Bergstrom (2001) (extended by 
Bergstrom and Bergstrom, 2004 to 5 other fields), mathematics in Binman et al., 1997, agriculture 
and biology in Cornell, 1998, as well as a study by the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999). 
4 McCabe (2002), Tenopir and King (2000), Kyrillidou and Young (2004), White and Creaser 
(2004), SQW Ltd (2003). 
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prices of the degree of concentration in the industry. This database is described 
in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the empirical relationship between journal 
prices, their quality measured by citations (or impact factor), age, number of 
articles per volume, their for-profit (FP), not-for-profit (NFP) or for profit on 
behalf of not for profit (NFPP) status, and fixed scientific field effects. We also 
introduce the degree of concentration of publishers (shares enjoyed by the 
single, and the two first publishers), which proves to have a very significant 
effect on prices. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
 
The database covers 22 scientific fields and over 2600 among the most highly 
reputed and cited journals, selected in the following way: 
- “fields” are defined by the Journal Citation Reports, 2003 (JCR in what 
follows) 
- all fields with more than 135 journals were selected in science (11 fields) and 
all fields with more than 80 journals in the social sciences (6 fields). This 
selection criterion unfortunately excluded chemistry and physics, which are 
subdivided into quite small fields, with the consequence that no single field 
contains 135 journals. We therefore included five more fields, which did not 
match the 135-journals criterion in science, but were those with the largest 
number of journals in chemistry and physics. See Table 1 for the fields 
included.5 
We classified these journals into three categories: (a) FP journals published 
by for-profit publishers, (b) NFP journals managed by not-for-profit publishers 
(scientific societies, University presses, etc.), and NFPP journals published and 
distributed by FP firms on account of scientific societies.6 
SWETS provides a database that includes in particular the following 
information for approximately 130,000 journals: prices (domestic and foreign 
between 2001 and 2004),7 publisher, and (quite often) year of first publication. 
                                                
5 These fields are not mutually exclusive: The same journal can be classified in “Mathematics, 
applied” and in “Mathematics” for instance. However, less than ten percent appear in more than 
one field. 
6 To do this we used the Catalogo Italiano dei Periodici Acnp (acnp.cib.unibo.it/cgi-
ser/start/it/cnr/fp/html) and the web. Many journals can be classified easily into one category, but 
for some journals it is less obvious, and some discretion had to be used.  
7 There are eight entries for prices: Domestic and foreign, each for four years. These prices are 
expressed in various currencies (usually the currency of the country in which the publisher is 
located). We converted these prices into Euros using IMF exchange rates (World Economic 
Outlook, 2005). The evolution of prices cannot be used directly for at least two major reasons: (a) 
the Euro was introduced in 2001 and several prices are still expressed in national currencies in 
2001, and even in 2002 (note that some publishers significantly increased their prices at that 
moment); and (b) the Euro has appreciated by some 40 percent against the dollar between July 
2001 ($1 = 0.87 Euro) and July 2004 ($1 = 1.21 Euro), that is during the period under study, an 
effect that cannot be corrected for. This may be at the origin of a systematic bias that makes NFP 
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The JCR (2003) provides the number of citations and impact factors. The two 
databases were merged. Though some journals in JCR are not in the SWETS 
database (some 8% percent), there is no systematic bias.  
Since turnover per field is not available, we constructed three types of 
producer market shares to measure concentration: share in total citations, share 
in number of journals, share in prices (obtained by adding prices of individual 
journals, and dividing by the sum of the prices in a given field), assuming that a 
library would buy the whole bundle of most-cited journals, or would buy only 
part of these, but in proportion to total shares. This also roughly represents the 
shares of bundles in the so-called “big deal” arrangements. Concentration is 
measured in terms of the share enjoyed by the single (C1), and the two largest 
(C2) firms. 
Finally, we took into account the language in which the journal is published 
(English, All other), as well as the number of articles in each journal in its 2003 
volume. 
We were able to retrieve the full set of information for over 2,600 journals 
that are clearly representative of top journals which receive the largest number 
of citations. These are also the journals, which are widely read by scientists, 
even if they also publish in other journals.  
In 2003, the most important publishers were Elsevier (involved in all 22 
fields), Wiley, Kluwer and Taylor and Francis (21 fields), Springer (16 fields), 
Blackwell (14 fields), Lippincott (4 fields only, but very heavily in 2 fields). 
These are all FP firms some of which (Blackwell, in particular) manage NFP 
journals. Market shares of the two largest firms in each field can be found in 
Table 1.8 
 
3. A Reduced-Form Econometric Analysis 
 
Are some observed characteristics and/or rules of conduct relevant in the pricing 
of scientific journals? We estimate a reduced form model in which (the log of) 
prices are regressed on observed quality characteristics, type of conduct and 
field dummies. Observed characteristics consist of (a) the field-normalized (log 
of the) number of citations (since we pool over fields, and since some fields 
have more citations than others, we normalize by dividing the number of 
citations to journal i which belongs to field j by the average number of citations 
of all journals belonging to the same field j), (b) the field-normalized (log of 
the) age (2003 minus year of first publication, normalized by field, since some 
                                                                                                                   
journals, mainly located in the United States, look cheaper than FP journals, more frequently 
located in Europe. However, this bias should not be large, since we averaged prices over the 
whole period, smoothing out the two extreme values. We eventually created a price indicator 
(called “prices” in what follows) that is the average of available prices.  
8 Note that in the meantime, Kluwer and Springer merged, and Cell Press was acquired by 
Elsevier. 
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fields are older than others), (c) the language of the journal (English, all other), 
(d) the (log of the) number of articles in the 2003 volume, which may also 
represent cost factors (handling of papers, refereeing, etc.). Dummy variables 
describe conduct: some journals are run by for profit publishers (FP), some by 
not-for-profit publishers or scientific societies (NFP) and some NFP journals are 
published by FP companies (NFPP). Other dummies represent fields, which 
may be taken as proxies for unobserved quality or conduct characteristics. We 
allow for interaction terms between observed characteristics and conduct to 
check whether the relationship differs across types of conduct. We also run 
alternative specifications, with prices (and other variables) per article instead of 
per journal, as well as impact factors in 2003 rather than citations. A single 
equation is estimated pooling all the observations. Regression coefficients are 
common to all fields, only intercepts vary (fields are represented by dummy 
variables).  
Conduct and citations may both be endogenous. Indeed, since mergers and 
acquisitions were quite frequent during the last 10 to 15 years, it may be that FP 
publishers acquired specific (that is expensive) NFP journals only, leaving the 
less profitable ones to scientific societies. One possibility to avoid this 
endogeneity would be to run the regressions with journals that did not change 
ownership during, say the last 20 years. We did however not pursue this issue: 
though ownership changed during the last years, most deals were struck 
between FP publishers only. To get rid, at least partly, of endogeneity between 
prices and citations, we also estimate a two-equations system in which citations 
are instrumented by lagged citations and age of the journal. 
In Table 2, we show the results of four regressions. In Eqs. (1), (2), and (4), 
the dependent variable is the logged price per journal, while Eq. (3) deals with 
logged prices per article. In Eq. (2) current citations are instrumented by ten 
year-lagged citations, age and their interactions with conduct (FP, NFP, NFPP). 
In Eq. (4) they are replaced by current impact factors. Since the results are very 
similar, our comments concentrate on Eq. (1). 
Most parameters9 are significantly different from zero at the less than one 
percent probability level. The only coefficients that are not are those carried by 
the interaction terms NFPP with Number of citations (or Impact factor), Age 
and Number of articles (this simply means that, in this dimension, NFPP 
journals are not different from NFP journals). 
Firstly, FP and NFPP journals charge roughly 3 and 2 times more than NFP 
journals, as shown by the coefficients picked by the FP and NFPP dummies. 
This confirms earlier findings.10 
                                                
9 Other than the field dummies, for which an F-test rejects equality. Coefficients vary between -
0.82 and +0.84.  
10 Cornell (1998) finds similar results but he studies only agricultural and biological journals. 
Moreover he divides NFP into Universities, Societies and Government. White and Creaser (2004) 
find that Oxford and Cambridge University Presses set lower prices than most FP. Chressanthis 
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Secondly, prices increase with number of citations (or impact factors) and 
decrease with age. The price elasticity of a one percent increase in (field-
normalized) citations is positive: In Eq. (1) it is equal to 0.14 for NFP and NFPP 
journals, and to 0.25 (that is 0.14+0.11) for FP journals. The effect is similar, 
though somewhat larger in Eqs. (2) and (3). The price elasticity of a one percent 
increase in age is negative (-0.14 to -0.35) for NFP journals. Older NFP journals 
are cheaper than more recent ones, but others (NFPPs and FPs) shade the effect 
of age, which may be due to FP journals being born later than NFP journals. As 
a result, FP and NFPP journals put less weight on age than NFP journals, and 
take advantage to a larger extent of the number of citations that they receive. 
The signs involving citations are particularly interesting. Indeed, they result 
from two effects. When a journal is cited, this is usually taken as an indication 
of “quality” and of high value to the reader. This can turn a profit-maximizing 
publisher to raise its price since the willingness to pay of readers increase. 
McCabe (2002, 2004) takes this approach when analyzing the behavior of FP 
publishers facing libraries, which try to buy the “best-value-for-money 
journals.” However, on average, one should expect that more citations imply 
larger circulation, and therefore, lower average production costs.11 As for the 
influence of age on prices, there are also two effects that may go in opposite 
directions. Launching of a new journal generates sunk costs that have to be 
recovered. Tenopir and King (2000) estimate that accumulated profits of a new 
journal are negative during the first six years. The journal may thus charge a 
higher price when it is new. On the other hand, the publisher may use an 
introductory price strategy: low price first to attract new readers and then 
increase prices once the journal is mature. 
Thirdly, the number of articles plays an important role, with a price 
elasticity of 0.26 to 0.45: Increasing the number of articles by 10 percent 
increases the price of a journal by 3 to 5 percent. There are no differences 
between FP, NFP and NFPP journals. 
                                                                                                                   
and Chressanthis (1994) find that being published by an NFP very significantly reduces the 
subscription price of an economic journal. Bergstrom and Bergstrom (2004) report that a page 
published by a FP is between 3 and 5 times more expensive than a page published by a NFP in 
ecology, economics, atmospheric sciences, mathematics neuroscience and physics. See also 
Bergstrom (2001). 
11 This assumption is vigourously disputed by publishers. The only data at hand are those 
collected by Bergstrom (www.econ.ucsb.edu/%7Etedb/Journals/pricing.html) on 103 journals. A 
linear correlation between citations and circulation leads to r = +0.748, though AER, JPE and 
Econometrica may be considered as outliers. Without AER, the correlation is still equal to +0.622, 
and discarding AER, JPE and Econometrica leads to r = +0.590. All three coefficients are largely 
different from zero at the 0.01 probabilty level. To avoid the influence of outliers, we also worked 
with ranks (both for citations and circulation). The resulting Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
is equal to +0.538; its t-value (the usual test, see Spiegel, 1956) is equal to 6.41 with 101 degrees 
of freedom which shows the r value to be significantly different from 0 at a smaller than 0.001 
probability level. If circulation data were available, one could envisage estimating a more 
complete model. 
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Fourthly, English-speaking journals are 20 to 60 percent more expensive 
than journals in other languages. 
Finally, there are large differences in prices across fields that remain 
unexplained. The “cheapest” field is Law, the “most expensive” ones are 
Physics and Chemistry. According to Eq. (1), “Law”, “Physics, applied” and 
“Chemistry, physical” charge respectively 43, 230 and 245, while Economics 
charges 100. Average prices vary thus between 1 and 6. To analyze the reasons, 
we first introduced 42 (2 times 21) interaction terms between FP and fields and 
NFPP and fields in Eq. (1). A standard F-test shows that this significantly 
reduces the residual variance of the regression (F42, 2576  = 2.54), so that the 
differences seem clearly related to conduct in the industry. 
We calculated Spearman rank correlation coefficients (See Siegel, 1956) 
between the coefficients picked by field dummies and degree of concentration 
of publishers, that is the share per field enjoyed by the first (C1) and the two 
first (C2) firms. The coefficients appear in the first two lines of Table 3. All of 
them are positive and significantly different from zero as shown by the t-values 
that are given next to the coefficients. Larger prices are thus correlated with 
larger concentration ratios. 
Though there may be some concern that concentration could be 
endogenous, we re-estimated our basic equation, removing the fixed effect field 
dummies, replacing them by concentration shares of publishers per field.12 
Results are given in the lower part of Table 3. Though the R-squared are smaller 
than in the specifications with fixed effects, the results are qualitatively similar 
to those of Table 2, and the effect of the concentration variables is again positive 
and significantly different from 0. We also interacted conduct (here NFP) with 
concentration shares (This could not be done for concentration in prices, since 
there is only one NFP firm (IEEE), which is first in Engineering, electric and 
electronic, and which ties with an FP firm (Elsevier)). For concentration in 
citations and number of journals, NFPs shade somewhat their power compared 
to FPs. 
All results point thus in the same direction. Concentration (in terms of 
prices, number of citations and number of journals) is correlated with the 
average price of journals. Clearly these results should be confirmed by larger 
samples of journals, that is larger number of fields, and more sophisticated 
estimation methods to avoid possible endogeneity problems (in particular when 
concentration in prices is used), but given the precision of our estimates, it is 
doubtful that the results could be reversed. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our empirical investigation documents a certain number of facts: 
                                                
12 The concentration shares are thus equal for all the journals belonging to a specific field. 
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1. There exist large price differences across fields.  
2. These differences seem to be correlated with the market power of 
publishers. The larger the concentration ratio, the larger the average 
price in a field, price to which should be added the large difference 
between FPs, NFPPs and NFPs. 
3. As a general rule, FP journals charge four times as much on average 
than NFP journals, for given number of citations, age, language, 
number of articles and field (or concentration ratio). Journals of 
scientific societies managed by FP publishers (NFPP) are twice as 
expensive as NFP journals (scientific societies exercise some control 
on prices). 
4. Prices are positively correlated with quality measured by the number of 
citations they receive (even when citations are instrumented), and this 
effect is larger for FP journals.  
We take the first finding as indicative of the fact that substitution 
possibilities across journals are limited, allowing for a significant amount of 
discretion in the setting of journal prices. Indeed, the technology of producing 
journals is widely available across fields of study, and the financial rewards 
offered to scientists as authors, referees and editors is sufficiently limited that 
differences in their labor market opportunities should not translate into very 
significant journal production costs across disciplines. Our finding is therefore 
indicative of large differences in price-cost ratios across disciplines, which is 
confirmed by the second finding that market concentration increases average 
prices.  
Our third and fourth findings are consistent with the first two. We confirm 
earlier research concerning the large price difference between FP and NFP 
journals, and show that prices of NFPP journals are somewhere in between. 
Moreover, we show that prices increase with citation counts while we have 
argued that costs should tend to fall when citation counts rise. This is consistent 
with “value-based pricing” (à la McCabe, 2002, 2004) rather than with cost-
based pricing, and is again indicative of publishers’ ability to exercise discretion 
in price setting, since journals and papers are hardly substitutes, and researchers 
need all of them. 
Note that these findings do not invalidate the fact that, as stressed for 
example by Tenopir and King (2000), on average, FP journals may have higher 
costs than some learned societies because they have lower average circulations. 
But our evidence (conclusion 4) indicates that individual journal prices do seem 
to follow other factors  than costs. Pricing is consistent with the idea that 
successful journals are priced higher so as to get a return on previous 
investment, and in particular to recoup the initial investment in new journals. 
Unsurprisingly, this feature especially characterizes FP journals. On the other 
hand, FP publishers have given new impetus to scientific publishing. They 
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launched many new field journals, while NFP publishers have focused on high 
quality journals. 13 
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Table 1 Shares of the Two Largest Firms (Breakdown by Fields)
No. of citations No. of journals Prices of bundles
First firm Second firm First firm Second firm First firm Second firm
Name Share Name Share Name Share Name Share Name Share Name Share
Biochemistry anf molecular biology E 23 ASS 21 E 29 W 8 E 43 W 10
Cell biology Nature 20 Cell Pr. 18 E 18 Bl 9 E 14 W 7
Chemical, multidisciplinary ASS 49 W 18 ASS, W 11 K, W 19
Chemistry, physical E 56 ASS 22 E 38 K 14 E 60 K 15
Clinical neurology Lip 32 E 14 E 16 L 13 E 23 Sp 20
Economics E 29 Bl 21 E 27 Bl 19 E 51 K 12
Education and educational research T&F 12 ASS 11 T&F 19 Bl 10 T&F 32 E 13
Engineering, chemical E 57 W 14 E 30 T&F 12 E 54 K 12
Engineering, electric and electronic IEEE 72 E 11 IEEE 40 E 15 E, IEEE 24
Law Ch, H 10 Harv 6 Am Bar 5 K 16 E 11
Materials sciences, multidisciplinary E 49 ASS 8 E 27 K 7 E 52 K 11
Mathematics, applied E 37 SIAM 16 E 27 Sp 7 E 39 W 15
Mathematics E 23 Sp 17 E,Sp 15 K 10 E 34 Sp 15
Neuroscience E 35 W 11 E 31 Bl 7 E 40 W 17
Pharmacy E 29 ASS 12 E 20 T&F 9 E 37 W 11
Physics, applied ASS 54 E 14 E 21 ASS 11 E 35 ASS 15
Physics, multidisciplinary ASS 58 E 24 ASS, E 16 E 43 ASS 15
Plant science ASS 16 Bl 15 K 11 Bl, Sp 8 K 24 Sp 16
Psychology, clinical ASS 30 E,PhPP 11 K 15 ASS 13 K 21 E 19
Psychology, multidisciplinary ASS 48 Bl, E, L 5 T&F 13 ASS 10 E 19 T&F 18
Sociology ASS 15 Bl 14 Sage 17 Bl 15 Sage 24 T&F 17
Surgery L 26 Saund 15 Sp 16 E 13 Sp 22 E 14
Total no. of cases
Blackwell 0 4 0 6 0 0
Elsevier 9 6 13 2 15 4
Kluwer or Springer 0 1 4 4 5 7
NFP 10 7 4 4 1 2
Wiley 0 3 1 1 1 5
Am Bar = Americ. Bar Assoc.; ASS= Americ. Scientific Assoc.; Bl = Blackwell; Cell Pr = Cell Press; Ch = Chicago; E = Elsevier; 
IEEE = IEEE; H = Harvard; K = Kluwer; L = Lippincott; Nature = Nature; PhPP = Physicians Postgrad. Press;  Saund = Saunders; 
 SIAM = SIAM; Sp = Springer; T&F = Taylor & Francis; W = Wiley.
In case of ties of two or more firms, all are counted in the total number of cases; if two firms are tying as first, no "second" firm is listed.
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Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4)
Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
For profit dummy (FP) 1.494 0.158 1.602 0.184 1.271 0.044 1.079 0.136
FP for NFP account (NFPP) 0.705 0.200 0.858 0.235 0.708 0.053 0.573 0.179
No. of citations 0.139 0.020 0.156 0.027 0.194 0.027
No. of citations*FP 0.107 0.025 0.167 0.036 0.074 0.035
No. of citations*NFPP 0.024 0.030 0.061 0.040 -0.051 0.041
Age -0.215 0.035 -0.346 0.042 -0.142 0.034
Age*FP 0.277 0.046 0.261 0.055 0.360 0.046
Age*NFPP 0.114 0.055 0.103 0.066 0.139 0.055
No. of articles 0.321 0.028 0.268 0.033 0.431 0.025
No. of articles*FP -0.049 0.033 -0.053 0.039 0.027 0.030
No. of articles*NFPP 0.011 0.043 -0.003 0.050 0.036 0.040
Impact factor 0.165 0.027
Impact factor*FP 0.004 0.034
Impact factor*NFPP 0.004 0.043
English language dummy 0.421 0.053 0.370 0.061 0.167 0.063 0.493 0.053
Intercept 3.590 0.142 3.772 0.162 1.405 0.093 3.134 0.125
Field dummies
Biochemistry anf molecular biology 0.618 0.075 0.701 0.085 -0.271 0.086 0.337 0.074
Cell biology 0.563 0.081 0.680 0.091 -0.132 0.095 0.377 0.081
Chemical, multidisciplinary 0.378 0.091 0.486 0.106 -0.590 0.104 0.103 0.090
Chemistry, physical 0.961 0.093 1.047 0.104 0.097 0.109 0.762 0.094
Clinical neurology 0.026 0.083 0.098 0.095 -0.698 0.098 -0.156 0.084
Economics 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Education and educational research -0.171 0.091 -0.246 0.097 -0.015 0.110 -0.113 0.093
Engineering, chemical 0.374 0.088 0.437 0.096 -0.339 0.104 0.199 0.089
Engineering, electric and electronic 0.497 0.078 0.649 0.086 -0.213 0.090 0.280 0.078
Law -0.821 0.089 -0.827 0.094 -0.531 0.105 -0.783 0.091
Materials sciences, multidisciplinary 0.558 0.080 0.738 0.096 -0.246 0.093 0.355 0.081
Mathematics, applied 0.586 0.078 0.665 0.087 0.199 0.093 0.505 0.079
Mathematics 0.334 0.076 0.388 0.084 0.036 0.092 0.298 0.078
Neuroscience 0.443 0.075 0.586 0.084 -0.212 0.089 0.273 0.076
Pharmacy 0.356 0.076 0.356 0.085 -0.336 0.090 0.213 0.077
Physics, applied 0.845 0.103 1.033 0.116 -0.460 0.116 0.476 0.102
Physics, multidisciplinary 0.888 0.108 1.047 0.119 -0.089 0.125 0.629 0.108
Plant science 0.232 0.082 0.294 0.088 -0.351 0.098 0.149 0.084
Psychology, clinical -0.103 0.092 -0.081 0.100 -0.233 0.112 -0.150 0.095
Psychology, multidisciplinary -0.086 0.088 -0.074 0.091 -0.053 0.106 -0.058 0.090
Sociology -0.235 0.092 -0.252 0.095 -0.018 0.111 -0.159 0.094
Surgery -0.198 0.084 -0.123 0.094 -1.134 0.098 -0.405 0.085
R-squared 0.649 0.681 0.389 0.634
No. of observations 2651 2079 2651 2638
                Table 2 Regression Results
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Table 3 Rank Correlations and Regression Results (Concentration)
Prices Citations No. journals
Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
Spearman Rank Correlations
Correlation Coefficient and t-value (C1) 0.548 2.930 0.619 3.520 0.535 2.830
Correlation Coefficient and t-value (C2) 0.581 3.190 0.677 4.110 0.513 2.670
For profit dummy (FP) 1.996 0.164 1.782 0.163 1.712 0.103
FP for NFP account (NFPP) 1.015 0.211 0.988 0.208 0.723 0.209
No. of citations 0.037 0.021 0.072 0.021 0.063 0.020
No. of citations*FP 0.119 0.027 0.110 0.026 0.112 0.027
No. of citations*NFPP 0.026 0.032 0.025 0.031 0.009 0.031
Age -0.217 0.038 -0.222 0.038 -0.225 0.037
Age*FP 0.333 0.050 0.319 0.049 0.310 0.049
Age*NFPP 0.170 0.059 0.163 0.059 0.165 0.058
No. of articles 0.562 0.026 0.483 0.027 0.494 0.026
No. of articles*FP -0.152 0.035 -0.107 0.035 -0.102 0.034
No. of articles*NFPP -0.077 0.045 -0.068 0.044 -0.021 0.044
English language dummy 0.462 0.056 0.437 0.055 0.416 0.055
Intercept 1.429 0.166 1.780 0.141 1.642 0.142
Concentration (C1) 0.377 0.035 0.407 0.031 0.498 0.034
Concentration (C1)*NFP -0.067 0.008 -0.079 0.015
R-squared 0.582 0.593 0.597
No. of observations 2651 2651 2651
